3.
POSITIVISMO
La crítica de Kant a la metafísica y la
tradición empirista de Hume influyen en la posición del positivismo, que
atiende únicamente al fenómeno –lo dado-, rechaza las esencias, causas y
abstracciones que superen la experiencia, y trata de establecer un sistema
coordinado de clasificación de hecho de sus relaciones o leyes.
En el ámbito del pensamiento europeo de la
segunda mitad del sigo XIX y comienzos del XX, el positivismo significó una
constante ideológica y metodológica que traspasó el ámbito de la filosofía
hacia las ciencias, que se esforzaron en llamarse positivas y hacia todas las
formas del pensamiento (Cientificismo).
El desarrollo técnico y el progreso de la
ciencia avalaron el método positivo de las ciencias naturales junto al
dinamismo que supuso la teoría evolucionista; no obstante, un cierto
mecanicismo subyace en todo positivismo.
El positivismo alcanza su madurez como sistema
en Auguste Comte (1798-1857),
y ello precisamente en la célebre “ley
de los tres estados” por los que atraviesa la historia del espíritu humano.
-
El Estado Teológico
En este primer estado el hombre hace depender
los fenómenos naturales de la voluntad de poderes personales superiores. Estos
poderes, en un estadio más primitivo, se atribuyen a las cosas que se imaginan
animadas (fetichismo), después a una serie de supuestos dioses que dominan
regiones amplias del ser (politeísmo) y aún más tarde a la fe en un Dios único
que rige todo el mundo (monoteísmo).
-
El Estado metafísico
En este nuevo estado se sigue preguntando por
el porqué de las cosas o fenómenos no en presuntas realidades divinas sino en
las cosas mismas. El principio de explicación se pone en las cosas mismas en
cuanto estas encierran o actúan de acuerdo con “propiedades”, “entidades
abstractas” o “poderes naturales”. La naturaleza de cada cosa, y en último
término la naturaleza, encierra la capacidad de explicación de los fenómenos.
El saber sigue levantándose sobre el poder de la imaginación, que crea y cree
en semejantes entidades.
-
El Estado Positivo
En esta fase conoce el hombre finalmente cuál
es la misión y esencia del saber humano. Ahora se limita este saber a lo “positivamente dado”, es decir, lo que es aprehensible en la experiencia
sensible externa e interna, y realmente se nos da de un modo inmediato.
Esto es ya realidad y no ficción.
La misión de la ciencia sobre una base
positiva es doble. Por un lado, descubrir lo que siempre igual y constante en
los fenómenos (formación científica de los conceptos); por otro, fijar su
consecución regular y constante (formulación científica de las leyes de los
fenómenos).
Con su ley de los tres estados, Comte
imprimió un notable impulso a la filosofía de la historia y a la sociología del
siglo XIX, en esto, parecidamente a Hegel.
** Críticas a la corriente de pensamiento:
-
El concepto de lo “dado” quiso presentarse como una consciente crítica
del conocimiento. De hecho, ese “dado”, lo mismo en Comte que en los demás
positivistas, fue entendido en una forma muy poco crítica, pues incluía
elementos “no-dados”.
-
Todo positivismo adolece, en realidad, de ese vicio; mil veces se le
ha hecho el reproche de ir ya con sus presuposiciones a su observación científica
y de introducir toda una tesis metafísica de fondo, pues no es otra cosa la presuposición inicial de que el ser se agota en
el fenómeno (lo dado).
-
Por lo demás, es bien claro que la ley de los tres estados no es precisamente un a comprobación histórica,
sino una anticipación teórica; la
gran metafísica medieval no eliminó, sino que apuntaló la teología, y la
ciencia moderna ha convivido cómodamente con la filosofía y la religión.
-
En cuanto a la religión, Comte, a pesar de su positivismo, necesita
todavía de ella. Sirve ésta, bien es verdad, a intereses estéticos.
El otro representante del positivismos
francés decimonónico es Jean Marie
Guyau. En su crítica del conocimiento, también quiere pulverizar todos
los “atavismos” del pensamiento metafísico para no quedarse sino con lo
efectivamente “dado”.
Su positivismo se aplica especialmente al
campo ético. La moralidad habrá de entenderse, según él, sin los conceptos de
deber y de una sanción divina. Sólo tiene que tener en cuenta los hechos positivos
de la existencia social del hombre. El hombre se encuentra en la comunidad
puramente “de hecho”. Su único lema ético es desenvolver su vida en ella y con
ella (somos responsables de los que nos pase).
El egoísmo es inmoral, porque es contra la
naturaleza. Se da un despliegue aún mayor de la vida cuando el hombre vive en
una compenetración vivencial con la totalidad del cosmos. Ese es el fin de la
evolución. Y con ella también queda eliminada la religión, lo mismo que la
metafísica y la ética metafísica.
En la misma dirección que el positivismo
francés opera el empirismo inglés, sólo que en éste lo psicológico ocupa el
primer plano de atención, tanto en el campo de investigación como en el método.
Los hombres que llevan la dirección son “J. Stuart Mill” y “H. Spencer”. Ambos
han ejercido un poderoso influjo en el pensamiento posterior.
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) es el segundo
representante destacado del empirismo inglés decimonónico. Es también uno de
los abanderados de las dos grandes consignas del siglo: la evolución y el
progreso.
Los positivistas alemanes del siglo XIX van
muy al lado de los ingleses. Las ideas fundamentales son las mismas: oposición
a la metafísica, limitación al dato sensible y, por consiguiente,
temporalización del ser y del hombre, fe en la evolución y en el progreso,
sustitución de la religión por la ciencia, el arte y la sociología.
3. POSITIVISM
The criticism of Kant of the metaphysics and the tradition empirista of Hume they influence the position of the positivism, which attends only on the phenomenon – the given thing - it pushes back the extracts, causes and abstractions that overcome the experience, and it tries to establish a coordinated system of classification de facto of its relations or laws.
Comte, founder of the French positivism, is the main representative of this tendency, which exhibited in the works “Course of Positive Philosophy” (1830-1842) and in “Systems of Positive Politics” (1825-1854). He insists on the concept of relation – of the science to the knowledge and of the things between themselves - and limits the philosophy to a theory and general methodology of the sciences, since only these are capable of discovering the steadfastness of the phenomena and forms (concepts and scientific judgments).
In the ambience of the European thought of the second half of the sigo XIX and beginning of the XXth, the positivism meant an ideological and methodological constant that penetrated the ambience of the philosophy towards the sciences, which strained in be calling prints and towards all the forms of the thought (Cientificismo).
The technical development and the progress of the science endorsed the positive method of the natural sciences along with the dynamism that supposed the evolutionist theory; nevertheless, a certain mecanicismo sublies in all positivism.
The positivism reaches its ripeness as system in Auguste Comte (1798-1857), and it precisely in the famous “law of the three states” for which it crosses the history of the human spirit.
- The Theological State
In this first state the man makes depend the natural phenomena of the will of top personal powers. These powers, in a more primitive stadium, assume to the things that imagine cheered up (fetishism), later to a series of supposed gods who dominate wide regions of the being (polytheism) and moreover late to the faith in the only God who governs the whole world (monotheism).
- The metaphysical State
In this new state he keeps on asking for the reason of the things or phenomena not in supposed divine realities but in the things themselves. The beginning of explanation puts itself in the things themselves as soon as they shut these up or act in accordance with “properties“, “abstract entities” or “natural powers”. The nature of every thing, and finally the nature, shuts up the capacity of explanation of the phenomena. The knowledge keeps on getting up on the power of the imagination, which it creates and believes in similar entities.
- The Positive State
In this phase the man knows finally what is the mission and extract of the human knowledge. Now this knowledge limits itself to “positively dice” that is to say, what is aprehensible in the external and internal sensitive experience, and really one gives to us in an immediate way. This is already a reality and not fiction.
The mission of the science on a positive base is double. On the one hand, to discover what always equal and constant in the phenomena (scientific formation of the concepts); for other, to fix its regular and constant attainment (scientific formulation of the laws of the phenomena).
With its law of the three states, Comte printed a notable impulse on the philosophy of history and on the sociology of the XIXth century, in this, similarly on Hegel.
** Criticism of the current of thought:
- The concept of the "given thing" wanted to present itself as a conscious criticism of the
knowledge. In fact, this "dice", the same in Comte that in other positivists, was understood in a very little critical form, since it was including "non-given" elements.
- All positivism suffers, in fact, from this vice; thousand times the reproach has been done to him of going already with its presuppositions to its scientific observation and of introducing the whole metaphysical fund thesis, since another thing is not the initial presupposition of that the being exhausts in the phenomenon (the given thing).
- Otherwise, it is quite clear that the law of the three states is not precisely one to historical cross-check, but a theoretical anticipation; the big medieval metaphysics did not eliminate, but it propped the theology up, and the modern science has coexisted comfortably with the philosophy and the religion.
- As for the religion, Comte, in spite of its positivism, needs still her. This one serves, well it is true, to esthetic interests.
Another representative of the nineteenth-century French positivismos is Jean Marie Guyau. In its criticism of the knowledge, also he wants to pulverize all the "atavisms" of the metaphysical thought not to remain but with really “Gave“.
His positivism is applied especially to the ethical field. The morality will have to be understood, according to him, without the concepts of duty and of a divine sanction. It has only to bear in mind the positive facts of the social existence of the man. The man is in the community purely “de facto“. Its only ethical motto is to unroll its life in her and with her (we are responsible for those that it spends to us).
The egoism is immoral, because it is against the nature. An even major deployment of the life happens when the man lives in an existential mutual understanding with the totality of the cosmos. This is the end of the evolution. And with her also the religion remains eliminated, the same as the metaphysics and the metaphysical ethics.
In the same direction as the French positivism the English empiricism produces, only that in this one the psychological thing occupies the attention forefront, both in the field of investigation and in the method. The men who take the direction are “J. Stuart Mill“ and “H. Spencer”. Both have exercised a powerful influence in the later thought.
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) sees positively given only in the momentary perceptions. They happen, neither according to he, nor objective extracts, nor timeless validities, nor activities aprióricas of the understanding. What prepares the science is exclusively the material of the experience, and its method is necessary the induction. Stuart Mill interprets the experience in view of the theory asociacionista understood from the psychological point of view.
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) is the second representative emphasized from the nineteenth-century English empiricism. He is also one of the standard-bearers of two big slogans of the century: the evolution and the progress.
The German positivists of the XIXth century go much next to the Englishmen. The fundamental ideas are the same: opposition to the metaphysics, limitation to the sensitive fact and, consequently, temporalización of the being and of the man, faith in the evolution and in the progress, replacement of the religion for the science, the art and the sociology.
3. POSITIVISM
The criticism of Kant of the metaphysics and the tradition empirista of Hume they influence the position of the positivism, which attends only on the phenomenon – the given thing - it pushes back the extracts, causes and abstractions that overcome the experience, and it tries to establish a coordinated system of classification de facto of its relations or laws.
In the ambience of the European thought of the second half of the sigo XIX and beginning of the XXth, the positivism meant an ideological and methodological constant that penetrated the ambience of the philosophy towards the sciences, which strained in be calling prints and towards all the forms of the thought (Cientificismo).
The technical development and the progress of the science endorsed the positive method of the natural sciences along with the dynamism that supposed the evolutionist theory; nevertheless, a certain mecanicismo sublies in all positivism.
The positivism reaches its ripeness as system in Auguste Comte (1798-1857), and it precisely in the famous “law of the three states” for which it crosses the history of the human spirit.
- The Theological State
In this first state the man makes depend the natural phenomena of the will of top personal powers. These powers, in a more primitive stadium, assume to the things that imagine cheered up (fetishism), later to a series of supposed gods who dominate wide regions of the being (polytheism) and moreover late to the faith in the only God who governs the whole world (monotheism).
- The metaphysical State
In this new state he keeps on asking for the reason of the things or phenomena not in supposed divine realities but in the things themselves. The beginning of explanation puts itself in the things themselves as soon as they shut these up or act in accordance with “properties“, “abstract entities” or “natural powers”. The nature of every thing, and finally the nature, shuts up the capacity of explanation of the phenomena. The knowledge keeps on getting up on the power of the imagination, which it creates and believes in similar entities.
- The Positive State
In this phase the man knows finally what is the mission and extract of the human knowledge. Now this knowledge limits itself to “positively dice” that is to say, what is aprehensible in the external and internal sensitive experience, and really one gives to us in an immediate way. This is already a reality and not fiction.
The mission of the science on a positive base is double. On the one hand, to discover what always equal and constant in the phenomena (scientific formation of the concepts); for other, to fix its regular and constant attainment (scientific formulation of the laws of the phenomena).
With its law of the three states, Comte printed a notable impulse on the philosophy of history and on the sociology of the XIXth century, in this, similarly on Hegel.
** Criticism of the current of thought:
- The concept of the "given thing" wanted to present itself as a conscious criticism of the
- All positivism suffers, in fact, from this vice; thousand times the reproach has been done to him of going already with its presuppositions to its scientific observation and of introducing the whole metaphysical fund thesis, since another thing is not the initial presupposition of that the being exhausts in the phenomenon (the given thing).
- Otherwise, it is quite clear that the law of the three states is not precisely one to historical cross-check, but a theoretical anticipation; the big medieval metaphysics did not eliminate, but it propped the theology up, and the modern science has coexisted comfortably with the philosophy and the religion.
- As for the religion, Comte, in spite of its positivism, needs still her. This one serves, well it is true, to esthetic interests.
Another representative of the nineteenth-century French positivismos is Jean Marie Guyau. In its criticism of the knowledge, also he wants to pulverize all the "atavisms" of the metaphysical thought not to remain but with really “Gave“.
His positivism is applied especially to the ethical field. The morality will have to be understood, according to him, without the concepts of duty and of a divine sanction. It has only to bear in mind the positive facts of the social existence of the man. The man is in the community purely “de facto“. Its only ethical motto is to unroll its life in her and with her (we are responsible for those that it spends to us).
The egoism is immoral, because it is against the nature. An even major deployment of the life happens when the man lives in an existential mutual understanding with the totality of the cosmos. This is the end of the evolution. And with her also the religion remains eliminated, the same as the metaphysics and the metaphysical ethics.
In the same direction as the French positivism the English empiricism produces, only that in this one the psychological thing occupies the attention forefront, both in the field of investigation and in the method. The men who take the direction are “J. Stuart Mill“ and “H. Spencer”. Both have exercised a powerful influence in the later thought.
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) sees positively given only in the momentary perceptions. They happen, neither according to he, nor objective extracts, nor timeless validities, nor activities aprióricas of the understanding. What prepares the science is exclusively the material of the experience, and its method is necessary the induction. Stuart Mill interprets the experience in view of the theory asociacionista understood from the psychological point of view.
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) is the second representative emphasized from the nineteenth-century English empiricism. He is also one of the standard-bearers of two big slogans of the century: the evolution and the progress.
The German positivists of the XIXth century go much next to the Englishmen. The fundamental ideas are the same: opposition to the metaphysics, limitation to the sensitive fact and, consequently, temporalización of the being and of the man, faith in the evolution and in the progress, replacement of the religion for the science, the art and the sociology.
No comments:
Post a Comment